# (1973-2013) - with an Employer Match Combined to Produce a Nest Egg of Almost $\$ 2$ Million 

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This study is intended to parallel an earlier study that addressed saving in an IRA account over a worker's career. The tables on this and the following pages show the results of saving in a $401(k) D e$ fined Contribution Plan, assuming an employer match of $50 \%$ of the employee's contributions. The employee's annual contribution was assumed to equal the relatively modest maximum allowable IRA contribution each year, starting in 1973 for an assumed 25 -year old worker, and continuing through 2013, when the worker turned 65. To illustrate results for a work career from age 25 to 65 , we assumed that $401(\mathrm{k})$ s (and IRAs) were available in 1973, versus their actual (later) inception dates. Each year's contribution was assumed to be equally divided into 12 monthly installments, with the first installment made at the end of January 1973. We assumed investment performance equal to that of the S\&P 500 Stock Index. Starting in 2002, workers age 50 and older were allowed somewhat higher IRA contribution limits, so we assumed corresponding higher $401(\mathrm{k})$ contributions in 2002 (when our sample worker was 54) through 2013. Rather than try to quantify the tax advantages of retirement plan contributions, we simply point out that these tax advantages made it easier to contribute to retirement accounts.

Discussion continued $\qquad$

| Year End: | 1973 | 1974 | 1975 | 1976 | 1977 | 1978 | 1979 | 1980 | 1981 | 1982 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Worker's Age: | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 | 34 |
| Employee Contribution: | 1,500 | 1,500 | 1,500 | 1,500 | 1,500 | 1,500 | 1,500 | 1,500 | 2,000 | 2,000 |
| Employee Contrib. w/ Match: | 2,250 | 2,250 | 2,250 | 2,250 | 2,250 | 2,250 | 2,250 | 2,250 | 3,000 | 3,000 |
| Cum. Employee Contributions: | 1,500 | 3,000 | 4,500 | 6,000 | 7,500 | 9,000 | 10,500 | 12,000 | 14,000 | 16,000 |
| Annual S\&P 500 Return: | -14.69\% | -26.47\% | 37.23\% | 23.93\% | -7.16\% | 6.57\% | 18.61\% | 32.50\% | -4.92\% | 21.55\% |
| Year of Initial Contribution: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1973 | 2,098 | 1,543 | 2,118 | 2,623 | 2,434 | 2,594 | 3,073 | 4,069 | 3,869 | 4,698 |
| 1974 |  | 1,972 | 2,706 | 3,351 | 3,111 | 3,315 | 3,926 | 5,199 | 4,944 | 6,003 |
| 1975 |  |  | 2,382 | 2,951 | 2,739 | 2,919 | 3,457 | 4,578 | 4,353 | 5,285 |
| 1976 |  |  |  | 2,397 | 2,225 | 2,371 | 2,808 | 3,719 | 3,536 | 4,293 |
| 1977 |  |  |  |  | 2,248 | 2,396 | 2,837 | 3,757 | 3,573 | 4,337 |
| 1978 |  |  |  |  |  | 2,329 | 2,759 | 3,653 | 3,474 | 4,218 |
| 1979 |  |  |  |  |  |  | 2,414 | 3,196 | 3,039 | 3,690 |
| 1980 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 2,638 | 2,509 | 3,046 |
| 1981 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 2,954 | 3,587 |
| 1982 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 3,628 |
| Year-end Value: | 2,098 | 3,515 | 7,206 | 11,322 | 12,757 | 15,925 | 21,274 | 30,810 | 32,251 | 42,784 |
| Bear markets lead to short-term |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | Table continued |  |  |  |  |  |  |

markets lead to short-term
Table continued losses and great long-term returns. See note next to the 2013 column.

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| Year End: | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Worker's Age: | 35 | 36 | 37 | 38 | 39 | 40 | 41 | 42 | 43 | 44 | 45 |
| Employee Contribution: | 2,000 | 2,000 | 2,000 | 2,000 | 2,000 | 2,000 | 2,000 | 2,000 | 2,000 | 2,000 | 2,000 |
| Employee Contrib. w/ Match: | 3,000 | 3,000 | 3,000 | 3,000 | 3,000 | 3,000 | 3,000 | 3,000 | 3,000 | 3,000 | 3,000 |
| Cum. Employee Contributions: | 18,000 | 20,000 | 22,000 | 24,000 | 26,000 | 28,000 | 30,000 | 32,000 | 34,000 | 36,000 | 38,000 |
| Annual S\&P 500 Return: | 22.56\% | 6.27\% | 31.73\% | 18.67\% | 5.25\% | 16.61\% | 31.69\% | -3.10\% | 30.47\% | 7.62\% | 10.08\% |
| Year of Initial Contribution |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1973 | 5,755 | 6,116 | 8,083 | 9,576 | 10,077 | 11,770 | 15,477 | 14,986 | 19,564 | 21,065 | 23,169 |
| 1974 | 7,354 | 7,815 | 10,328 | 12,236 | 12,876 | 15,040 | 19,776 | 19,149 | 24,998 | 26,916 | 29,605 |
| 1975 | 6,475 | 6,880 | 9,093 | 10,773 | 11,336 | 13,242 | 17,412 | 16,859 | 22,009 | 23,698 | 26,065 |
| 1976 | 5,260 | 5,590 | 7,387 | 8,752 | 9,209 | 10,757 | 14,145 | 13,696 | 17,880 | 19,252 | 21,175 |
| 1977 | 5,314 | 5,647 | 7,463 | 8,841 | 9,304 | 10,868 | 14,290 | 13,837 | 18,064 | 19,449 | 21,392 |
| 1978 | 5,167 | 5,491 | 7,257 | 8,597 | 9,047 | 10,568 | 13,895 | 13,455 | 17,565 | 18,912 | 20,802 |
| 1979 | 4,521 | 4,804 | 6,349 | 7,522 | 7,915 | 9,246 | 12,157 | 11,772 | 15,368 | 16,547 | 18,200 |
| 1980 | 3,731 | 3,965 | 5,240 | 6,208 | 6,533 | 7,631 | 10,034 | 9,716 | 12,684 | 13,657 | 15,022 |
| 1981 | 4,394 | 4,669 | 6,171 | 7,311 | 7,693 | 8,986 | 11,816 | 11,441 | 14,937 | 16,082 | 17,689 |
| 1982 | 4,445 | 4,723 | 6,242 | 7,395 | 7,782 | 9,090 | 11,953 | 11,573 | 15,109 | 16,268 | 17,893 |
| 1983 | 3,149 | 3,346 | 4,422 | 5,239 | 5,513 | 6,439 | 8,467 | 8,198 | 10,703 | 11,524 | 12,675 |
| 1984 |  | 3,202 | 4,232 | 5,013 | 5,275 | 6,162 | 8,103 | 7,845 | 10,242 | 11,028 | 12,129 |
| 1985 |  |  | 3,432 | 4,066 | 4,278 | 4,997 | 6,571 | 6,363 | 8,307 | 8,944 | 9,837 |
| 1986 |  |  |  | 3,094 | 3,256 | 3,803 | 5,001 | 4,842 | 6,322 | 6,807 | 7,486 |
| 1987 |  |  |  |  | 2,657 | 3,104 | 4,081 | 3,951 | 5,159 | 5,554 | 6,109 |
| 1988 |  |  |  |  |  | 3,167 | 4,165 | 4,033 | 5,265 | 5,669 | 6,235 |
| 1989 |  |  |  |  |  |  | 3,319 | 3,213 | 4,195 | 4,517 | 4,968 |
| 1990 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 3,036 | 3,964 | 4,268 | 4,694 |
| 1991 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 3,337 | 3,593 | 3,952 |
| 1992 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 3,182 | 3,499 |
| 1993 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 3,129 |
| 1994 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1995 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1996 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1997 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1998 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1999 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2000 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2001 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2002 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2003 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2004 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Year-end Value | 55,565 | 62,249 | 85,698 | 104,621 | 112,751 | 134,871 | 180,662 | 177,966 | 235,671 | 256,929 | 285,725 |
| $\uparrow$ 个 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| It took 14 years to exceed \$100,000. $\quad$ It took just five more years to doubl |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

On one hand, the results are straightforward. We made no heroic assumptions. Despite several bear markets during 1973-2013 (some steep), the favorable ending results were driven primarily by (1) starting to save at age 25 , (2) consistently saving what many would consider relatively modest amounts, (3) taking advantage of the employer match—essentially free money, and (4) achieving S\&P 500 returns. Indeed, significantly improved results could have been achieved by starting to save at an earlier age and/or saving more. (Imagine starting in 1973 with 2013's contribution limit of $\$ 5,500$, rather than $\$ 1,500$.) Better investment results would also help, but for the purpose of this analysis we choose to emphasize the easier alternatives. On the other hand, relatively few 65 -year olds in 2013 have amassed nest eggs of almost $\$ 2$ million. (This statement does not apply to our clientele.) The reasons for this include (1) not saving on a consistent basis, especially in the critical earlier years, (2) not saving enough, (3) making withdrawals, and (4) failing to achieve S\&P 500 returns.

| Year End: | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Worker's Age: | 46 | 47 | 48 | 49 | 50 | 51 | 52 | 53 | 54 | 55 | 56 |
| Employee Contribution: | 2,000 | 2,000 | 2,000 | 2,000 | 2,000 | 2,000 | 2,000 | 2,000 | 3,500 | 3,500 | 3,500 |
| Employee Contrib. w/ Match: | 3,000 | 3,000 | 3,000 | 3,000 | 3,000 | 3,000 | 3,000 | 3,000 | 5,250 | 5,250 | 5,250 |
| Cum. Employee Contributions: | 40,000 | 42,000 | 44,000 | 46,000 | 48,000 | 50,000 | 52,000 | 54,000 | 57,500 | 61,000 | 64,500 |
| Annual S\&P 500 Return: | 1.32\% | 37.58\% | 22.96\% | 33.36\% | 28.58\% | 21.04\% | -9.10\% | -11.89\% | -22.10\% | 28.68\% | 10.88\% |
| Year of Initial Contribution |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1973 | 23,472 | 32,257 | 39,700 | 52,947 | 68,078 | 82,397 | 74,902 | 66,002 | 51,411 | 66,162 | 73,355 |
| 1974 | 29,992 | 41,217 | 50,728 | 67,654 | 86,989 | 105,285 | 95,708 | 84,336 | 65,692 | 84,540 | 93,732 |
| 1975 | 26,406 | 36,289 | 44,663 | 59,565 | 76,588 | 92,697 | 84,265 | 74,252 | 57,838 | 74,432 | 82,525 |
| 1976 | 21,452 | 29,481 | 36,283 | 48,390 | 62,219 | 75,306 | 68,456 | 60,321 | 46,987 | 60,467 | 67,042 |
| 1977 | 21,672 | 29,783 | 36,656 | 48,886 | 62,857 | 76,078 | 69,158 | 60,940 | 47,469 | 61,088 | 67,730 |
| 1978 | 21,073 | 28,961 | 35,644 | 47,537 | 61,122 | 73,978 | 67,249 | 59,258 | 46,158 | 59,401 | 65,860 |
| 1979 | 18,438 | 25,339 | 31,185 | 41,591 | 53,477 | 64,725 | 58,837 | 51,846 | 40,385 | 51,971 | 57,622 |
| 1980 | 15,218 | 20,914 | 25,740 | 34,328 | 44,139 | 53,422 | 48,563 | 42,792 | 33,333 | 42,896 | 47,560 |
| 1981 | 17,920 | 24,628 | 30,310 | 40,424 | 51,976 | 62,908 | 57,186 | 50,391 | 39,251 | 50,513 | 56,005 |
| 1982 | 18,127 | 24,912 | 30,660 | 40,890 | 52,576 | 63,634 | 57,846 | 50,972 | 39,704 | 51,096 | 56,651 |
| 1983 | 12,841 | 17,647 | 21,719 | 28,965 | 37,243 | 45,077 | 40,976 | 36,107 | 28,125 | 36,195 | 40,130 |
| 1984 | 12,288 | 16,887 | 20,784 | 27,719 | 35,641 | 43,137 | 39,213 | 34,554 | 26,915 | 34,637 | 38,403 |
| 1985 | 9,966 | 13,696 | 16,856 | 22,480 | 28,905 | 34,984 | 31,802 | 28,023 | 21,828 | 28,091 | 31,145 |
| 1986 | 7,584 | 10,423 | 12,828 | 17,108 | 21,998 | 26,625 | 24,203 | 21,327 | 16,612 | 21,379 | 23,703 |
| 1987 | 6,189 | 8,506 | 10,468 | 13,961 | 17,951 | 21,726 | 19,750 | 17,403 | 13,556 | 17,445 | 19,342 |
| 1988 | 6,316 | 8,681 | 10,684 | 14,248 | 18,320 | 22,174 | 20,157 | 17,761 | 13,835 | 17,804 | 19,740 |
| 1989 | 5,033 | 6,917 | 8,513 | 11,353 | 14,598 | 17,668 | 16,061 | 14,153 | 11,024 | 14,187 | 15,730 |
| 1990 | 4,756 | 6,536 | 8,044 | 10,728 | 13,794 | 16,695 | 15,177 | 13,373 | 10,417 | 13,406 | 14,863 |
| 1991 | 4,004 | 5,502 | 6,772 | 9,031 | 11,612 | 14,055 | 12,776 | 11,258 | 8,770 | 11,286 | 12,513 |
| 1992 | 3,545 | 4,872 | 5,996 | 7,997 | 10,283 | 12,445 | 11,313 | 9,969 | 7,765 | 9,993 | 11,080 |
| 1993 | 3,170 | 4,356 | 5,361 | 7,150 | 9,194 | 11,127 | 10,115 | 8,913 | 6,943 | 8,935 | 9,906 |
| 1994 | 3,034 | 4,169 | 5,131 | 6,844 | 8,800 | 10,650 | 9,682 | 8,531 | 6,645 | 8,552 | 9,482 |
| 1995 |  | 3,441 | 4,235 | 5,649 | 7,263 | 8,790 | 7,991 | 7,041 | 5,485 | 7,058 | 7,826 |
| 1996 |  |  | 3,339 | 4,453 | 5,726 | 6,930 | 6,300 | 5,551 | 4,324 | 5,565 | 6,170 |
| 1997 |  |  |  | 3,377 | 4,343 | 5,256 | 4,778 | 4,210 | 3,279 | 4,220 | 4,679 |
| 1998 |  |  |  |  | 3,430 | 4,151 | 3,774 | 3,325 | 2,590 | 3,333 | 3,696 |
| 1999 |  |  |  |  |  | 3,339 | 3,035 | 2,674 | 2,083 | 2,681 | 2,972 |
| 2000 |  |  |  |  |  |  | 2,810 | 2,476 | 1,928 | 2,482 | 2,752 |
| 2001 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 2,938 | 2,289 | 2,946 | 3,266 |
| 2002 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 4,765 | 6,132 | 6,799 |
| 2003 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 6,131 | 6,798 |
| 2004 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 5,661 |
| Year-end Value | 292,494 | 405,414 | 502,300 | 673,275 | 869,122 | 1,055,261 | 962,082 | 850,699 | 667,408 | 865,023 | 964,736 |
|  |  |  | $\uparrow$ |  |  |  | $\overline{5}$ | $\uparrow$ | 7 |  |  |

It took five more years to double again.

Another bear market. Another buying opportunity.

Failing to achieve S\&P 500 returns is a common result when savers hold lower-returning investments (such as bank deposits, most bonds or over-hyped faddish investments) in an attempt to reduce the near-term volatility that is characteristic of S\&P 500 performance, or when savers temporarily succumb to their fears and suspend saving (or sell) during bear markets. We hope you will carefully study these tables and see that in spite of frequent short-term market volatility, long-term investment performance has been remarkable. In fact, short-term market volatility produced great buying opportunities. Put differently, for the purpose of nest-egg formation, bear markets are not to be feared. (It is investors' reactions to bear markets that should be feared.) Rather, they should be welcomed-and exploited.


A big bear market, and a big buying opportunity.
Note: Do you think stocks are risky and bank deposits are not? If we had assumed T-Bill returns (comparable to bank deposits) instead of stock returns, the final 2013 value would have been far less. Smaller nest eggs increase the risk of outliving your money.

